mine why and under what conditions ad hominem criticisms of circumstantial inconsistency are reasonable or fallacious, and how a defender can or should respond to such attacks. A proposal for solving this general family of problems with the ad hominem had already been presented in Walton (1985) , but it leads to a more specific problem. Suppose an arguer is fairly accused of committing a circumstantial inconsistency. If the case is made completely enough, can the argument of this arguer be refuted, or does the arguer always have a way out, a reasonable reply that would defend his argument? If a reply is always available in principle, then it would seem to follow that the ad hominem argument is always defeasible by the one to whom it had been directed. This specific problem has to do with what Hamblin called the "nailing down" of a fallacy. If a circumstantial ad hominem argument can never be finally "nailed down" against an arguer, what does this tell us about the logic of ad hominem arguments? Before stating the problem in detail, it may be well to review the general nature of the circumstantial ad hominem argument as a type of criticism in reasoned dialogue.
REASONABLE AND FALLACIOUS AD HOMINEM CRITICISMS
In the circumstantial ad hominem attack, the critic claims that an arguer's statements or arguments advocated are inconsistent with that arguer's own personal circumstances. The term 'circumstances' refers broadly to the arguer's personal convictions or commitments, the arguer's personal situation, or very often the arguer's actions or personal practices. Case 1.0: A politician urges wage restraint to resist inflation, but a critic points out that this politician has recently granted himself a raise in his own already high salary.
The critic's allegation here is that the politician does not personally practise the policy he advocates for all as a standard of restraint. This basic type of argument is a very common and also very powerfully effective form of political attack of an opponent's credibility or integrity.l Ad hominem arguments can, in some instances, be reasonable criticisms, or so it is maintained in Walton (1985) . However, they can also involve important types of errors or fallacies. Perhaps the most important error, which could be called the basic ad hominem fallacy, is to conclude that because the arguer has advocated a proposition A, yet is committed by his personal circumstances to the opposite of A, therefore the arguer's contention must be false (per se). This type of fallacy, recognized by Barth and Martens (1977) and Walton (1985) , could be described as a form of invalid argument -the argument that A is incompatible with an arguer's concessions, therefore A is false.
